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Iiams, 319 Md. at 494,573 A.2d at 814 
(citingSard, 281 Md. at 439,379 A.2d at 
1014). 
Next, the court looked at each appli-
cable health statute in detail, noting 
their procedural and substantive due 
process requirements. Williams argued 
that § 10-708 did not provide for proper 
notice, the right to attend the meeting, 
the right to a written decision, or the 
right to an appeal. Id. at 492,573 A.2d at 
813. 
After addressing the applicable health 
statutes, the court focused upon the 
Supreme Court cases of Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 US. 307 (1982) and Wash-
ington v. Hatper, 11 0 S. Ct. 1028 ( 1990). 
The court used these cases to support 
the rationale that due process consider-
ations could be satisfied if professional 
judgment was used to override the pa-
tient's objections. Williams, 319 Md. at 
495, 573 A.2d at 813. 
Although Youngberg did not deal 
with forcible administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs, the case did address what 
rights a person involuntarily committed 
to a state institution possessed under 
the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. The Court in Youngberg 
concluded that such an individual could 
be restrained to the extent deemed 
necesary by the medical profession. Wil-
liams, 310 Md. at 497, 573 A.2d at 814 
(citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 324). In 
reaching this decision, the Supreme 
Court stated "it was necessary to bal-
ance the liberty of the individual and the 
demands of an organized society." Id. at 
495, 573 A.2d at 814, (citing Young-
berg, 457 US. at 320). Specifically, the 
court reasoned that although the com-
mitted individual possessed certain 
rights, the state also had legitimate rea-
sons for restraining a committed indi-
vidual's liberty. Id. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court 
stated that deference should be given to 
the decisions made by the medical staff 
of an institution in that judges and juries 
were not better qualified than medical 
professionals in determining which pro-
cedures best protect an individual's lib-
erty interests. Id. at 496,573 A.2d 814 
(citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 322-23). 
Unlike Youngberg, the recently de-
cided case of Harper deals specifically 
with whether a state had the right to 
forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs 
to an involuntarily committed prisoner. 
In answering in the affirmative, the 
Court held that the state had a rational 
basis for administering the drugs to the 
inmates, regardless of their displeasure. 
Williams, 319 Md. at 499, 573 A.2d at 
816. 
It found that, substantively, the state's 
administrative policy was a "rational 
means of furthering the state's legiti-
mate objectives of administering drugs 
for treatment purposes under the direc-
tion of a licensed psychiatrist." Id. at 
502, 573 A.2d at 817 (citing Harper, 
110 S. Ct. at 1042). Procedurally, the 
Court stated that nothing in the Consti-
tution prohibited the state from permit-
ting medical personnel to make that 
decision "under fair procedural mecha-
nisms." Id. at 503, 573 A.2d at 818 (cit-
ing Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042). 
Although the court of appeals noted 
that Williams was not a prisoner in a 
penal institution, as was the patient in 
Harper, it stated that Harper set forth 
procedural due process guidelines for 
determining whether Williams' consti-
tutional rights were violated. Id., at 508, 
573 A.2d at 820. The court concluded 
that because § 10-708 did not provide 
Williams with notice of the final review 
proceeding, or the ability to present 
evidence, or the ability to cross examine 
witnesses, it did not afford the requisite 
procedural due process protections to 
which Williams was entitled. Id. at 509-
10,573 A.2d at 821. 
The court ruled, therefore, that it was 
error to enter summary judgment against 
Williams, and it was error to deny Wil-
liams' motion for partial summary judg-
ment. Consequently, the court held that 
the common law rule, as set forth in 
Sard v. Hardy, requiring a patient's con-
sent before the administration of such 
drugs, applied in William's case. Id. at 
510,573 A.2d at 821 (citingSard, 281 
Md. at 439,379 A.2d at 1014). 
The court of appeals concluded that 
additional procedural due process pro-
tections were owed to Williams even 
though the Supreme Court, in Harper, 
specifically did not require such protec-
tions. In so holding, it is obvious that the 
Maryland court wished to give invol-
untarily committed individuals addi-
tional guarantees of due process protec-
tion above and beyond what the Supreme 
Court required. 
- Kathleen Dunivin Scbmitt 
Eanes v. State: RESTRICTIONS ON 
THE VOLUME LEVEL OF 
PROTECTED SPEECH HELD 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
In Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 569 
A.2d 604 (1990), the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that a statute limiting 
the volume level of protected speech 
does not violate the first amendment to 
the United States Constitution 
While speaking against abortion in 
front of the Hagerstown Reproductive 
Clinic ("Clinic"), Jerry Wayne Eanes 
("Eanes") made no threat of violence, 
no effort to physically restrain those 
entering the Clinic, and made no attempt 
to block access to the Clinic. Eanes, 318 
Md. at 441, 569 A.2d at 606. Addition-
ally, Eanes did not use obsenity, profan-
ity or attempt to incite violence. Eanes 
spoke without artificial amplification, 
yet, was alleged to have spoken so loudly 
that he was heard above the noise 
generated by traffic. Throughout the 
day, local residents and people employed 
in the vicinity made several complaints 
to the local police regarding the loud-
ness of Eanes' speech. Id. 
After the police department had re-
ceived numerous complaints concern-
ing the volume level of the demonstra-
tor, the police warned Eanes to lower 
his voice. Eanes ignored the warning 
and was arrested for disturbing the 
peace in violation of Md. Ann. Code art. 
27, § 121 (1989). Section 121 makes it 
unlawful for anyone to "wilfully disturb 
any neighborhood in [any Maryland] 
city, town or county by loud and un-
seemly noises." Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 
121 (1989). Eanes was found guilty in 
the District Court of Maryland for Wash-
ington County. Eanes, 318 Md. at 442, 
569 A.2d at 607. 
On appeal, Eanes, citing Diebl v. State, 
294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert. 
denied, 460 US. 1098 (1983), con-
tended that only speech not protected 
by the first amendment was subject to a 
statutory prohibition against "loud and 
unseemly noises." Eanes, 318 Md. at 
443, 569 A.2d at 607. The court, dis-
agreed with Eanes' interpretation, and 
explained that the prohibition against 
"loud and unseemly noises" in Diehl 
sought to regulate objectionable con-
tent of speech. Whereas in Eanes, the 
court pointed out, it was the volume 
level which was objectionable, not the 
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content of the speech. [d. at 444, 569 
A.2d at 607-08. 
The court began its analysis by distin-
guishing between content-neutral and 
content-based statutes. The court noted 
that to pass constitutional muster, con-
tent-based restrictions in a public forum 
must serve a compelling state interest 
and be narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end. [d. at 447, 569 A.2d at 609 (citing 
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tioners' Ass'n, 460 u.s. 37,45 (1983)). 
Alternatively, content-neutral regula-
tions of time, place and manner must be 
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government [ al] interest, and leave open 
ample alternative channels of commun-
ication." [d. at 447-48,569 A.2d at 609 
(quoting Frisby v. Shultz, 487 u.s. 474, 
481 (1988». 
The court held that Section 121 was a 
content-neutral regulation of manner of 
expression that served to limit, under 
proper circumstances, loudness of de-
livery. To hold otherwise, the court 
noted, would improperly render the stat-
ute invalid. [d. at 448,569 A.2d at 610 
(citing City of College Park v. Cotter, 
309 Md 573, 589, 525A2d 1059,1067 
(1987». The court explained that stat-
utes are presumed to be constitutional, 
such that when one interpretation would 
render the statute unconstitutional and 
another would render the statute valid, 
the statute must be interpreted in such a 
manner to be constitutional. [d 
The court next examined the type of 
forum at issue. [d. at 446, 569 A.2d at 
609. Eanes spoke on the street and 
sidewalk. The court concluded that 
streets and sidewalks are traditional 
public forums where the right to free 
speech cannot be broadly and abso-
lutelydenied.[d. at 447, 569A.2dat609 
( citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 
(1988); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 
515 (1976)). 
Given the context of a public forum, 
the court went on to consider the three 
requirements of a constitutionally per-
missible content-neutral statute. First, 
there must exist a substantial govern-
mental interest. Second, the statute must 
be narrowly tailored. Finally, ample al-
ternative channels of communication 
must be left open. [d. at 447-48, 569 
A.2d at 609. 
The court began by determining 
whether a substantial governmental in-
terest existed. Following United States 
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Supreme Court decisions, the court con-
cluded that "government ha[s] a sub-
stantial interest in protecting its citizens 
from unwelcome noise." [d at 449, 569 
A.2d at 610 (quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 
( 1989». This governmental interest in 
the protection of the unwilling listener 
from undue noise intrusion in the pri-
vacy of ones' home has been extended 
by the Supreme Court to include the 
protection of the unwilling listener in a 
publicforum.[d. at450, 569A.2dat61O 
(citing Frisby, 487 u.s. at 484; Ward, 
491 U.S. at 791). The extension of pro-
tection afforded to the unwilling lis-
tener in a public forum, the court ex-
plained, involved the notion of a "captive 
audience" which is defined as the "un-
willing listener or viewer who cannot 
readily escape from the undesired com-
munication, or whose own rights are 
such that he or she should not be re-
quired to do so." [d. at 4 51, 569 A.2d at 
611. The Eanes court, therefore, held 
that Section 121, affording protection to 
a captive audience from "unreasonably 
loud and disruptive communications 
emanating from the street," was a con-
tent-neutral restriction which served a 
substantial governmental interest. [d. at 
453,569 A.2d at 612. 
The narrowly tailored statutory re-
quirement, the court determined, was 
satisfied "so long as the ... regulation 
promotes a substantial government[al] 
interest that would be achieved less ef-
fectively absent the regulation." [d. at 
454, 569 A.2d at 613 (quoting United 
States v. Albertini, 472 u.s. 675, 689 
( 1985». The court concluded that the 
protection of the captive audience, those 
persons employed and living in the vicin-
ity of the Clinic, would be achieved less 
effectively absent the volume level regu-
lation. [d. at 484-55,569 A.2d at 613. 
The court considered the availability 
of alternative channels of communica-
tion which included speaking at a lower 
volume, individual contact, and distri-
bution of literature or the carrying of a 
sign. The court deemed all of these 
alternatives to be less instrusive on 
unwilling listeners. Therefore, the court 
held that Section 121 does not inhibit 
the use of various alternative channels of 
communication. [d. at 456, 569 A.2d at 
613-14. 
Eanes also alleged on appeal that Sec-
tion 121 was void for vagueness. The 
court noted that a provision was vague if 
it is not sufficiently explicit to inform 
persons what conduct will render them 
liable to its penalties. [d. at 458-59, 569 
A.2d at 615 (citing Bowers v. State, 283 
Md. 115, 120, 389 A2d 341, 345 
(1978)). The court referred to this as 
the fair notice principle which "is 
grounded on the assumption that one 
should be free to choose between lawful 
and unlawful conduct." Id. at 459, 569 
A.2dat615 (quotingBowers, 283 Md at 
121, 389 A.2d at 345). The court re-
jected Eanes' contention that there 
should be specific decible guidelines 
and went on to add that a "[s]tatute 
which is both general enough to take 
into account a variety of human conduct 
and sufficiently specific to provide fair 
warning that certain kinds of conduct 
are prohibited" is not vague simply 
because it involves an imprecise norma-
tivestandard.ld. at 459, 569A.2dat615 
(quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 u.s. 
104,110 (1972». 
Alternatively, the Court noted that a 
statute may be void if it allows for irra-
tional and selective enforcement. Id. at 
464, 569 A2d at 617 (citing Bowers, 
283 Md at 122, 389 A 2d at 346). How-
ever, a statute is not vague merely be-
cause it allows the exercise of discretion 
on behalf of law and judicial enforce-
ment officials. Id The Court found, 
therefore, that Section 121 does not 
permit arbitrary or discriminatory en-
forcement.ld at 464, 569 A.2d at 618. 
The court concluded that prior warn-
ing by police authority is required in 
order that a speaker is made aware that 
his speech is unlawfully disruptive. Id. at 
463, 569 A2d at 617. Eanes had been 
asked by residents and persons in the 
surrounding business community to re-
duce his volume of speech and the local 
police department had warned Eanes 
that his loudness was disrupting the 
peace. Consequently, the court found 
that Eanes was sufficiently warned and 
was aware that further communication 
at the offensive volume level would 
result in prosecution. Id. at 466-67, 569 
A.2d at 619. Therefore, the court held 
that Section 121 was constitutional on 
its face and as applied. Id. at 466-67, 569 
A.2d at 619-20. 
The court then addressed Eanes' con-
tention that Section 121 was overboard 
because it had a chilling effect on the 
freedom of speech. Id at 464, 569 A.2d 
at 618 (citing City of Los Angeles v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US. 789, 
796-98 ( 1.984)). A statute should not be 
struck down for being overbroad, "un-
less there is a realistic danger that the 
statute itself will significantly compro-
mise recognized First Amendment pro-
tections of parties not before the Court." 
[d. at 465, 569 A2d at 618 (quoting 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 us. at 801). 
Section 121 contains applicable en-
forcement standards, and does not reach 
beyond conduct which can be regulated 
consistent with the first amendment. 
The court concluded, therefore, that 
Section 121 was not overbroad. [d. 
Judge Eldridge argued vehemently 
against state restrictions on the volume 
level of protected speech in his dissent. 
Judge Eldridge was of the opinion that 
Diehl stood for the proposition that the 
phrase "loud and unseemly" could only 
serve to limit speech which "presented 
a clear and present danger of violence, 
or [speech] not intended as communi-
cations but merely as a guise to disturb 
other persons." [d at 470, 569 A2d at 
620 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). He found 
Section 121 unconstitutional as applied 
because the limitations on speech made 
the delivery of speech a crime.[d at 473, 
569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge,]., dissent-
ing). Judge Eldridge went on to note 
that" [a )nnoyance at ideas can be cloaked 
in annoyance at sound" [d. at 475,569 
A.2d at 623 (quoting Saia v. New York, 
334 us. 558,562 (1948)) (Eldridge,]., 
dissenting). He then criticized the 
majority which found that "[s]ound is 
one of the most intrusive means of 
communication," and pointed out that 
"sound, in the form of the spoken word, 
is the most basic thing protected by the 
First Amendment." [d. at 476, 569 A.2d 
at 624 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). 
Judge Eldridge found the court's re-
quirement of prior warning an illusory, 
ineffective protection as any time 
government authorities desire to sup-
press first amendment activity, they 
could easily find complainants to give 
prior warnings. [d. at 490, 569 A2d at 
630 (Eldridge, ]., dissenting). He be-
lieved that Eanes' speech was within his 
constitutional guarantees and concluded 
his dissent expressing his fear for those 
persons who speak on controversial 
topics. [d. at 500, 569 A.2d at 635-36. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
"balanc[ed] one's right to express him-
self and other's right to be free from 
disruption." [d. at 467,569 A.2d at 619. 
The Court concluded that Section 121 is 
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to 
serve a substantial governmental inter-
est and leaves open ample alternative 
channels of communication. Eanes was 
given fair notice that the volume level of 
his speech would be subject to prosecu-
tion ifit was not lowered. Therefore, the 
statute did not violate Eanes' right to 
free speech. 
- Kimberly A. Doyle 
Jones v. State: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IS VIOLATED 




In Jones v. State, 319 Md. 279,572 
A2d 169 (1990), the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, held that a police stop of a 
bicyclist for investigatory purposes based 
on a hunch, without a reasonable articu-
lable suspicion justifying the stop, vio-
lated the fourth amendment. The court 
reasoned that a seizure occurred when 
the officer commanded the bicyclist to 
stop, thus affording fourth amendment 
protection. 
Carl Lee J ones was riding his bicycle 
at 3:20 a.m. carrying a grocery bag hang-
ing from the handlebars and, apparently, 
drycleaning bags across his shoulders 
and travelled from the general direction 
of a drycleaning store. The area where 
J ones was riding had been the scene of 
several recent burglaries. Officer Brown 
spotted Jones and in language to the 
effect of "hey, could you come here," 
commanded him to stop. Once stopped, 
the officer noticed a bulge in Jones' 
jacket pocket that appeared to be a 
handgun. A pat down search yielded a 
.25 caliber pistol. A subsequent search 
of the grocery bag yielded various quan-
tities of cocaine, marijuana, and other 
p_araphemalia Jones was arrested and 
charged with possession and intent to 
distribute cocaine, possession of mari-
juana, and unlawful wearing and trans-
porting of a handgun. 
Prior to trial, Jones made a motion to 
suppress the evidence on the ground 
that the search and seizure was illegal 
because of the illegal stop. Jones, 319 
Md. at 280, 572 A.2d at 170. The trial 
court denied his motion based on its 
finding that the initial encounter was 
not a seizure. Jones was convicted. [d 
The court of special appeals affirmed 
the conviction, finding the initial en-
counter was a "mere accosting", and not 
a seizure under the fourth amendment. 
[d. at 282, 572 A.2d at 171. The court 
determined that the stop was a "mere 
accosting" because there was no show 
of force or weapons used to effectuate 
the stop; and, therefore, the trial court 
properly denied the motion to suppress. 
[d. The court of appeals granted 
certiorari. 
The issue on appeal was whether the 
stop was a legal seizure under the fourth 
amendment. Jones argued that an illegal 
stop and seizure occurred when the 
police ordered the stop of his bicycle 
without reasonable articulable suspicion. 
[d. The state posited two competing 
arguments. Either there was no error 
by the trial judge and therefore, the stop 
was consensual rather than custodial in 
nature and was not a seizure. Alterna-
tively, if the stop was a seizure, there was 
sufficient articulable suspicion to justify 
the stop. [d. 
The court began its analysis by stating 
the general rule that a police stop is a 
seizure when a reasonable person would 
feel that his freedom to walk away was 
restrained. [d. at 282, (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 US. 1 (1968)). Additionally, 
the court, in distinguishing a seizure 
from a "mere accosting" held that a 
seizure occurs when an individual to 
whom questions are posed does not feel 
free to disregard the questions and walk 
away. [d. at 283, 572 A.2d 171 (citing 
U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 us. 544 
( 1980)). Adopting a totality of the cir-
cumstances approach to determine what 
constitutes a seizure, the court stated 
that one or all of the following factors 
may persuade a trial court that a seizure 
occurred: (1) threatening presence of 
several officers; (2) show or use of a 
weapon; (3) physical contact by the 
officer; or ( 4) authoritative tone or lan-
guage by the officer indicating an order 
rather than a request. [d. 
Applying the Mendenhall factors, the 
court noted in Florida v. Royer, 460 u.s. 
491 (1983), that merely approaching an 
individual and asking questions consti-
tuted a voluntary stop and was not a 
seizure unless the person approached 
was detained. Rejecting the use of a 
bright line test, the court instead posited 
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